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Abstract
We analytically study a carrier sense multiple access (CSMA)-based network. In the network, the
nodes have their own average throughput demands for transmission to a common base station. The
CSMA is based on the request-to-send (RTS)/clear-to-send (CTS) handshake mechanism. Each node
individually chooses its probability of transmitting an RTS packet, which specifies the length of its
requested data transmission period. The RTS packets transmitted by different nodes in the same time
slot interfere with one another, and compete to be received by the base station. If a node’s RTS has
the received signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) higher than the capture ratio, it will be
successfully received. The node will then be granted the data transmission period. The transmission
probabilities of RTS packets of all nodes will determine the average throughput and power consumption
of each node. The set of all possible throughput demands of nodes that can be supported by the network
is called the feasible throughput region. We characterize the feasible throughput region and provide an
upper bound on the total power consumption for any throughput demands in the feasible throughput
region. The upper bound corresponds to one of three points in the feasible throughput region depending
on the fraction of time occupied by the RTS packets.
Index Terms
Performance analysis, carrier sense multiple access (CSMA), medium access control (MAC), RTS/CTS,
power consumption, Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The progress of wireless network technologies has provided ubiquitous services. Medium
access control (MAC) is one of the important mechanisms that contribute to the success of
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1wireless networks. For example, in wireless local area network (WLAN), the Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) and its variants are used as the MAC
protocol (see more information in the IEEE 802.11 standards [1]).
Several studies analyzed the performance of IEEE 802.11-based networks, and some meth-
ods were proposed to improve the efficiency of channel utilization and power consumption
[2][3][4][5][6]. In [3], Bianchi developed a discrete-time Markov chain model to describe the
evolution of the 802.11 backoff process. In [4], Calı`, Conti and Gregori used the p-persistet
model instead of the standard binary exponential backoff in IEEE 802.11 due to its simplicity
for analytical studies. The difference there is in the selection of the backoff interval which is
sampled from a geometric distribution with parameter p. It was shown that the p-persistent
IEEE 802.11 can closely approximate the standard protocol. In [7], Tay and Chua adopted a
different modeling approach based on average values for analytical study. They derived closed-
form approximations for the collision probability and maximum throughput. All these works
considered the saturated throughput of the system.
Later, the analytical model in [4] was further explored. In [5], a distributed tuned backoff was
proposed and analyzed in depth. In [6], the optimal p value that maximizes the throughput and
minimizes energy consumption was derived for a p-persistent CSMA model.
Recent advances in signal processing enabled the possibility of receiving a packet when
multiple nodes are transmitting packets simultaneous. This is known as the multipacket reception
(MPR) capability [8]. There have been some studies showing that the system performance of the
earlier WLAN design based on the collision channel (i.e., packets collide when more than one
node transmit) is not optimal and can be enhanced with MPR [9][10]. The system performance
of WLAN can also be improved by utilizing multi-user diversity. The readers are referred to
[11] and the references therein for this issue.
From a completely different point of view, Lee et al [12] used the tool of game theory [13][14]
and discovered that the nodes in the network are participating implicitly in a noncooperative game
with appropriate utility functions in backoff-based MAC protocols. Game theory is a useful tool
in analyzing distributed networks with self-configuring nodes and Nash equilibrium is a solution
concept of a game. The readers are referred to [15] for the application of game theory in wireless
networks.
Most studies on the performance analysis of a wireless network were under the condi-
tion of homogeneous nodes, i.e., the nodes use the same transmission probability, with the
same transmission rate, etc. In this paper, we study a simple CSMA-based wireless network
2with heterogeneous nodes. In this multiple access network, each node has its own throughput
demand to a common base station, and chooses its transmission probability individually to
satisfy its throughput demand. The MAC protocol considered is CSMA with the request-to-send
(RTS)/clear-to-send (CTS) handshake mechanism which was originally introduced to solve the
hidden terminal problem (see the IEEE 802.11 standards [1] for a survey).
The objective of our paper is similar to that of [6], that is, to analyze the throughput and power
consumption of a CSMA-based network. However, there are some differences. First, we consider
heterogeneous nodes that node i uses pi-persistent CSMA in the network. Second, the numbers
of slots occupied by data transmissions were assumed to be identical and independent geometric
random variables for all nodes in [6]. In our paper, the lengths of data transmission periods
differ from user to user. Third, we consider the CSMA model with the RTS/CTS handshake
mechanism which is different from the CSMA model in [6].
Our paper is also similar to [16] in the CSMA model. However, we incorporate into the
network one particular MPR model, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) capture
model, which is more general than the collision channel in [16]. In addition, in [16] the lengths
of data transmission periods were the same for all nodes. Also, [16] focused on the analysis of
convergence of the distributed algorithm which the authors significantly strengthened from their
earlier work [17], whereas our paper aims to characterize the the feasible region of throughput
demands (which will be called the feasible throughput region in the remainder of this paper for
brevity) and power consumption in the network.
Other related works are [18][19] which characterized the feasible quality of service (QoS)
region, or SINR region, that can be supported by CDMA networks with power control. However,
those results can not be applied to our model in which the number of users interfering with one
another is random.
A. Contributions and Organization of this Paper
This paper is devoted to analyzing the throughput and power consumption of a CSMA-based
network. With appropriate formulation through a game-theoretic approach, the traditional system
(optimal) performance is contained in the Nash equilibrium. We study the Nash equilibrium point,
which, in the game model considered, is a vector of probabilities of transmitting requests (RTS
packets) for heterogenous nodes in the CSMA network. The properties of the Nash equilibrium
are then used to derive the feasible throughput region of the network. We further derive an upper
bound on the total power consumption for any throughput demands in the feasible throughput
3region, and show that the upper bound corresponds to one of three points in the feasible
throughput region depending on the fraction of time occupied by the RTS packets.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the details of our network model in Section
II, and formulate the problem in Section III. The main results of this paper on the analysis of
feasible throughput region and power consumption of the network are derived in Section IV.
Finally, some conclusions are given in Section V.
II. THE NETWORK MODEL
We consider a wireless network, where n nodes transmit data to a common base station (BS)
over a shared channel. Time is slotted. Nodes intending to send data ask for the permission to
transmit from the BS by sending an RTS packet. The BS responds with a CTS packet granting
the use of the channel to at most one node at a time. Let the total duration of this two-way
handshake be T0 slots. If no node is granted the permission to send data, the two-way handshake
is repeated for the next T0 slots. If node i is granted the permission, it can send its data without
the interruption from the other nodes for a duration of Ti slots, where Ti is specified in the RTS
packet sent by node i. The transmission power is PT for all nodes, for the RTS as well as the
data packets. Without loss of generality, the transmission data rate is defined as one data packet
per slot, where each data packet contains the same amount of data.
Independent Rayleigh fading channels between nodes and the BS are assumed. The period of
exchanging RTS and CTS is called the handshake phase, and the period of data transmission
is called the transmission phase. Fig. 1 illustrates the CSMA with the RTS/CTS handshake
mechanism. We also assume that all nodes always have data to send as in [3][6][4] to analyze
the network.
Reception model:
In each handshake phase, the BS can successfully receive the RTS packet with SINR larger
than the capture ratio b, and grant the permission to the corresponding node. We assume that
b > 1 (which is common for most systems except the spread spectrum systems), so at most one
node is granted the permission.
Behavior of Nodes:
We associate node i with an average throughput demand ρi (in terms of the average number of
successfully received data packets per slot), and assume that node i chooses a request probability
pi such that it randomly transmits an RTS packet with probability pi in every handshake phase.
The request probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) determines the average throughput and power
consumption of each node.
4III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. SINR Capture Model
We first consider the probability of successful reception of the RTS packet from a particular
node (thus the data transmission is granted to that node). In a given handshake phase, the SINR
of node i’s RTS packet is given by
SINRi =
Bi|hi|
2PT
N0 +
∑
j 6=iBj|hj |
2PT
(1)
where Bi is a binary indicator which is 1 if node i sends an RTS in that handshake phase, and 0
otherwise. N0 is the power of the additive noise at the BS, hi is the channel gain between node
i and the BS. We assume |hi|2, i = 1, . . . , n, are independent, exponentially distributed random
variables with mean one.
When s nodes simultaneously transmit RTS packets to the BS, the probability of data trans-
mission granted to a particular node (say, node 1) is given by
Pr [SINR1 > b] = Pr
[
s∑
i=2
|hi|
2 −
|h1|
2
b
< −
N0
PT
]
=
(
1
1 + b
)s−1
e
−b
N0
PT ,
where the last equality is obtained as follows. Let the probability density function (PDF) of
|h1|
2 be f|h1|2(x) = e−x, x ≥ 0, then f− |h1|2
b
(x) = bebx, x ≤ 0, and the PDF of the sum of the
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) |hj|2 is given by f∑s
i=2 |hi|
2(x) = x
s−2
(s−2)!
e−x, x ≥ 0.
It follows that the PDF of
∑s
i=2 |hi|
2 − |h1|
2
b
for x ≤ 0 is given by
f∑s
i=2 |hi|
2−
|h1|
2
b
(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−t
ts−2
(s− 2)!
beb(x−t)dt =
(
1
1 + b
)s−1
bebx (for x ≤ 0).
Therefore,
Pr
[
s∑
i=2
|hi|
2 −
|h1|
2
b
< −
N0
PT
]
=
∫ −N0
PT
−∞
f∑s
i=2 |hi|
2−
|h1|
2
b
(x)dx =
(
1
1 + b
)s−1
e
−b
N0
PT .
Considering a given request probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) based on which the nodes
send RTS packets, the probability of data transmission granted to a particular node can then be
expressed as a function of p by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Assuming that the capture ratio is b, and there are n nodes in the network
having the request probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn), then in a handshake phase, node i is
granted data transmission with probability
Gi(p1, . . . , pn) , Pr (BS grants node i data transmission|p)
= e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1 + b
)
. (2)
5Proof: Let (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ I−{y1,...,yl} denote x1 < · · · < xk, all belonging to the node index
set I−{y1,...,yl} , {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {y1, . . . , yl}, where \ denotes the set minus operator. Then
Gi(p1, . . . , pn) =
n∑
s=1
Pr(s nodes request)·Pr(node i is granted|s nodes request)
=pi ·
∏
j∈I−i
(1− pj) · e
−b
N0
PT
+ pi ·
∑
j∈I−i
pj ∏
k∈I−{i,j}
(1− pk)
 · ( 1
1 + b
)
e
−b
N0
PT
+ pi ·
∑
(j,k)∈I−i
pjpk ∏
l∈I−{i,j,k}
(1− pl)
 ·( 1
1 + b
)2
e
−b
N0
PT
+ · · ·
+ pi
∏
j∈I−i
pj
 · ( 1
1 + b
)n−1
e
−b
N0
PT
=e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j∈I−i
(1− pj)
+
∑
j∈I−i
( pj
1 + b
) ∏
k∈I−{i,j}
(1− pk)

+
∑
(j,k)∈I−i
( pj
1 + b
)(
pk
1 + b
) ∏
l∈I−{i,j,k}
(1− pl)

+ · · ·
+
∏
j∈I−i
(
pj
1 + b
)
=e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i
[(
pj
1 + b
)
+ (1− pj)
]
=e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1 + b
)
.
In every handshake phase, the BS grants data transmission to node i with probability Gi. It
follows that, on average, node i transmits data with period GiTi after every handshake period
6T0.
For the data transmission, assume that the entire data transmission period is encoded as one
codeword which is called a frame. Further assume that a good channel code, such as turbo
codes, is used. Then, the frame error rate at reasonable operating signal to noise ratios (SNR)
is smaller or stays roughly the same as Ti (code block size) increases [20][21]. In time varying
channels, the frame error rate decreases with Ti even more evidently if proper interleaving is
applied to exploit the increased time diversity (due to increased code block size). We denote
the frame success rate of node i averaged over all possible channel realizations, when node i’s
RTS packet is successfully received and its data transmission period is Ti, as P si (Ti). Note that
in time-correlated channels with coherence time larger than the handshake period T0, P si (Ti)
is usually close to one due to node i’s good channel quality that won the competition in the
handshake period. Then, we have the average throughput as the following expression (this simple
result can be formally obtained from the renewal process [22]).
Proposition 2: The average throughput of node i is given by
ri(p) =
P si (Ti)GiTi
T0 +
∑
j GjTj
, (3)
where Gi = e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i(1 −
bpj
1+b
), P si (Ti) is the average frame success rate of node i when
the data transmission period is Ti slots, and we have used
∑
j to denote
∑n
j=1 for simplicity.
Let Si(p) denote the normalized average power consumption of node i (normalized by the
transmission power PT ). Then Si(p) is equal to the fraction of time in which node i transmits
either RTS or data packets. In the sequel, we will simply call Si(p) the average power consump-
tion of node i for brevity. By defining T˜0 < T0 as the actual duration of an RTS packet, the
following proposition can be easily obtained from Proposition 2.
Proposition 3: The (normalized) average power consumption of node i is given by
Si(p) =
piT˜0 +GiTi
T0 +
∑
j GjTj
, (4)
where T˜0 < T0 is the actual duration of an RTS packet.
B. Noncooperative Game Formulation
We use the concept of Nash equilibrium in game theory to formulate our problem. The system
can be modeled as a noncooperative game with constraints which are the average throughput
demands. The nodes are the players, and the actions of a player (node) are: (i) selecting a
request probability pi that can sustain the average throughput demand ρi while minimizing the
7average power consumption Si in (4); (ii) transmitting an RTS packet with probability pi in every
handshake phase. Note that action (i) has an action space {pi : 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1}, while when pi has
been chosen, action (ii) has only one element in the action space, that is to randomly transmit
an RTS packet with probability pi in every handshake phase. Thus the Nash equilibrium will be
analyzed with respect to the strategy for action (i), that is, what request probability to choose. A
Nash equilibrium point is a situation in which each node chooses its best strategy unilaterally to
maximize its utility function (or minimize its cost function). The interested reader are referred
to [13][14] for further information about game theory.
Let p−i represent the vector of the request probabilities of all nodes except node i, and
ri(pi, p−i) represent the average throughput of node i when it requests with probability pi given
that the other nodes request with probability vector p−i. We define the utility function for node i
as Ui(pi, p−i) = 1−Si(p) (which may be seen as the power left for node i), and the (constrained)
Nash equilibrium point for our problem as follows.
Definition 1: A vector of the request probabilities p is a (constrained) Nash equilibrium point
if for all i = 1, . . . , n, we haveri(pi, p−i) ≥ ρiUi(pi, p−i) ≥ Ui(p˜i, p−i), ∀p˜i ∈ {p˜i : ri(p˜i, p−i) ≥ ρi}, (5)
where ρi, the average throughput demand, defines a constraint.
Equivalently, p is a Nash equilibrium point if
pi ∈ arg min
0≤p˜i≤1
{Si(p˜i, p−i) : ri(p˜i, p−i) ≥ ρi}, ∀i. (6)
The above expression means that at a Nash equilibrium point p, each node i would not prefer
to deviate from its choice of request probability. It should be noted that our problem is a game
with constraints, so there are additional constraints in defining our Nash equilibrium point that
differs from the conventional Nash equilibrium point.
Since Gi(p) is increasing in pi, and decreasing in pj for j 6= i, both the average throughput
ri(p) and the average power consumption Si(p) are increasing in pi. It follows that (p1, . . . , pn)
(where pi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i) is a Nash equilibrium point if and only if it is a solution to the set of
equations
ri(p) =
P si (Ti)GiTi
T0 +
∑
j GjTj
= ρi, ∀i. (7)
Remark: The idea of Nash equilibrium point in game theory is from noncooperative interaction
between nodes. Therefore, for most cases at the Nash equilibrium point, the system performance
8is suboptimal as compared to that at the traditional system-optimal solution. In this paper, because
the traditional system-optimal solution to satisfy the throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) must also
satisfy (7), it is also a Nash equilibrium point defined above.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NETWORK
We now analyze the equilibrium equations. For conciseness of the derivation, let ρˆi , ρiP si (Ti) .
Taking summation of both sides of (7), we have∑
iGiTi
T0 +
∑
j GjTj
=
∑
i
ρˆi , ρt (8)
⇒
∑
j
GjTj =
ρtT0
1− ρt
.
Substituting this into (7),
Gi =
T0ρˆi
Ti(1− ρt)
. (9)
Using Proposition 1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Given the throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn), and let ρˆi , ρiP si (Ti) and
∑
i ρˆi , ρt.
The request probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) is a Nash equilibrium point if and only if
T0ρˆi
Ti(1− ρt)
= e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1 + b
)
, ∀i. (10)
Again, for conciseness of the derivation, let Tˆ0 , eb
N0
PT T0. Hereafter (11) will be used.
Tˆ0ρˆi
Ti(1− ρt)
= pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1 + b
)
, ∀i. (11)
A. Feasible Throughput Region
Definition 2: A throughput demand vector (ρ1, . . . , ρn) is called feasible if there is a Nash
equilibrium p = (p1, . . . , pn) for it, that is, there is a solution to (11). The feasible throughput
region when node i uses data transmission period Ti is defined as
Ω(T1, . . . , Tn) , {(ρ1, . . . , ρn) : a Nash equilibrium exists for (ρ1, . . . , ρn)}.
We will show that if there is a Nash equilibrium point for (ρ1, . . . , ρn) when the data trans-
mission periods are (T1, . . . , Tn), then there is also a Nash equilibrium point for (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
when the data transmission periods are (T ′1, . . . , T ′n), where T ′i ≥ Ti for all i. In other words,
we have
9Proposition 5: If T ′i ≥ Ti ∀ i, then Ω(T1, . . . , Tn) ⊂ Ω(T ′1, . . . , T ′n).
Proof: Assume (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ Ω(T1, . . . , Tn), i.e., there is a request probability vector
(p
(0)
1 , . . . , p
(0)
n ) satisfying
Tˆ0ρˆi
Ti(1− ρt)
= p
(0)
i
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bp
(0)
j
1 + b
)
, ∀i.
We will start from the request probability vector (p(0)1 , . . . , p
(0)
n ), and successively update the
request probability vector to (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) such that
Tˆ0ρˆi
T ′i (1− ρt)
= p∗i
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bp∗j
1 + b
)
, ∀i. (12)
Note that ρˆi = ρiP si (Ti) , and as discussed in Section III-A, P
s
i (T
′
i ) ≥ P
s
i (Ti) when T ′i ≥ Ti, ∀i. If
we choose (ρ′1, . . . , ρ′n) such that ρˆi =
ρi
P si (Ti)
=
ρ′i
P si (T
′
i )
, then we will have ρ′i ≥ ρi, ∀i. If a solution
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) to (12) exists, we can conclude that (ρ′1, . . . , ρ′n) ∈ Ω(T ′1, . . . , T ′n), that is, there is a
Nash equilibrium for the throughput demands (ρ′1, . . . , ρ′n). Since the average throughput ri(p) is
increasing in pi, in this case, it can be easily verified that there will also be a Nash equilibrium
for (ρ1, . . . , ρn) when ρi ≤ ρ′i, ∀i. Therefore, we have proved that (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ Ω(T ′1, . . . , T ′n).
We now prove (12). Assume that Ti < T ′i for some i (otherwise, we are done since Ti = T ′i
for all i). Without loss of generality, assume that i = 1. Note that pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1+b
)
decreases
as pi decreases and it increases as pj , j 6= i, decreases. There exists p(1)1 < p
(0)
1 such that
Tˆ0ρˆ1
T ′1(1− ρt)
= p
(1)
1
∏
j 6=1
(
1−
bp
(0)
j
1 + b
)
.
We update the request probability vector from (p(0)1 , . . . , p
(0)
n ) to (p
(1)
1 , p
(0)
2 , . . . , p
(0)
n ). Then, by
fixing the request probabilities of all nodes but node 2, there exists p(1)2 < p
(0)
2 such that
Tˆ0ρˆ2
T ′2(1− ρt)
= p
(1)
2
(
1−
bp
(1)
1
1 + b
)
n∏
j=3
(
1−
bp
(0)
j
1 + b
)
.
The request probability vector is updated from (p(1)1 , p
(0)
2 , . . . , p
(0)
n ) to (p
(1)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(0)
3 , . . . , p
(0)
n ).
This process is repeated to update the request probabilities to p(1)j < p
(0)
j , for j ≥ 3, each time
by fixing the request probabilities of all nodes but node j, until the request probability vector
becomes (p(1)1 , p
(1)
2 , . . . , p
(1)
n ).
We then consider again the request probability of node 1. There exist p(2)1 < p
(1)
1 such that
Tˆ0ρˆ1
T ′1(1− ρt)
= p
(2)
1
∏
j 6=1
(
1−
bp
(1)
j
1 + b
)
.
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Repeating the same process, we will have the updated request probability vector (p(2)1 , p
(2)
2 , . . . , p
(2)
n ).
By continuously updating the request probability vector, we will get decreasing sequences
p
(0)
i > p
(1)
i > p
(2)
i > · · · , for i = 1, . . . , n. Because the request probabilities are lower bounded
by zero, p(q)i → p∗i as q →∞ for i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that
Tˆ0ρˆi
T ′i (1− ρt)
= p∗i
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bp∗j
1 + b
)
, ∀i.
We now give some properties about the feasible throughput region.
Theorem 1: There are at most two Nash equilibrium points for any feasible throughput de-
mands (ρ1, . . . , ρn), and exactly one Nash equilibrium point, called the better Nash equilibrium
point, with
∑n
i=1 pi ≤
b+1
b
. In other words, given any feasible throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) in
the feasible throughput region, there is exactly one Nash equilibrium (p1, . . . , pn) with
∑n
i=1 pi ≤
b+1
b
satisfying (11).
Proof: In Appendix A.
Remark: The better Nash equilibrium point is clearly the traditional system-optimal solution.
With Theorem 1, the following characterization of the feasible throughput region is easily
obtained.
Corollary 1:
Ω(T1, . . . , Tn) =
{(
P s1 (T1)G1T1
T0 +
∑
j GjTj
, . . . ,
P sn(Tn)GnTn
T0 +
∑
j GjTj
)
: 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i,
∑
i
pi ≤
b+ 1
b
}
,
(13)
where Gi = e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i(1−
bpj
1+b
).
B. Power Consumption
The following proposition gives the average power consumption at a Nash equilibrium point
p = (p1, . . . , pn) for the throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn).
Proposition 6: The average power consumption of node i at a Nash equilibrium point p =
(p1, . . . , pn) for the feasible throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) is given by
Si(p) = ρˆi +
T˜0
T0
(1− ρt)pi, (14)
where T˜0 < T0 is the actual duration of an RTS packet, ρˆi = ρiP si (Ti) , and ρt =
∑
i ρˆi.
Proof: In each time slot, the channel is in either the handshake phase or the transmission
phase. Hence, at the Nash equilibrium point for the throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn), the fraction
11
of time slots node i transmits data equals to ρˆi (since the average frame success rate is P si (Ti)),
and the RTS/CTS handshake phase occupies a fraction 1 −
∑
i ρˆi of the total time slots. With
node i’s request probability pi, the fraction of time in which node i transmits RTS packets is
(1 − ρt)piT˜0/T0. The proposition follows since the average power consumption equals to the
fraction of time node i transmits RTS or data packets.
Finally, we relate the total average power consumption to feasible throughput demands in an
optimal system. The key idea is in the following proposition:
Proposition 7: If node i uses data transmission period Ti for all i, then, within the feasible
throughput region Ω(T1, . . . , Tn), the maximum total average power consumption
∑
i Si(p) at
the better Nash equilibrium point is equal to the maximum total average power consumption in
the region {(p1, . . . , pn) :
∑
i pi ≤
b+1
b
, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1}.
Proof: The result follows directly from Theorem 1 and its corollary.
The following theorem gives an upper bound on the total average power consumption when
b > 2, and all nodes use the same data transmission period.
Theorem 2: Assuming that the capture ratio b > 2 and all nodes use the same data transmission
period MT0 and the same channel code, then for any feasible throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
(i.e., (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ Ω(MT0, . . . ,MT0)), the total average power consumption
∑
i Si(p) at the
better Nash equilibrium point is upper bounded by
1) If n = 1, then S1(p1) ≤ M ′+βM ′+1 .
2) If n > 1, then 
∑
i Si(p) ≤
M ′+β
M ′+1
if β ≤ M
′b(1−Ψb,n)
1+M ′+M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
,∑
i Si(p) ≤
M ′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
if M
′b(1−Ψb,n)
1+M ′+M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
≤ β ≤ b
b+1
,∑
i Si(p) ≤
M ′Γ(n)+β b+1
b
M ′Γ(n)+1
if β ≥ b
b+1
,
(15)
where M ′ = Me−b
N0
PT , β = T˜0
T0
is the RTS fraction, Γ(n) = b+1
b
(1− 1
n
)n−1, and
Ψb,n =
(n− 1)(1 + b)2 − nb
b(1 + b)(n− 1)
[
bn+ n− b− 2
(1 + b)(n− 1)
]n−2
(16)
Proof: In Appendix B.
From the proof of Theorem 2, we know that the bound is tight, i.e., the equality of the
total average power consumption given in Theorem 2 can be satisfied by a point in the feasible
throughput region (with (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ {(1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, 1(n−1)b , . . . , 1(n−1)b), ( b+1nb , . . . , b+1nb ), and
their permutations}) when all nodes use the same data transmission period and channel code. For
the general case, we give the following upper bound on the total average power consumption.
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Corollary 2: Assuming that the capture ratio b > 2 and node i uses data transmission period
Ti, then for any feasible throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ Ω(T1, . . . , Tn), the total average
power consumption
∑
i Si(p) at the better Nash equilibrium point is upper bounded by
1) If n = 1, then S1(p1) ≤ m′+βm′+1 .
2) If n > 1, then 
∑
i Si(p) ≤
m′+β
m′+1
if β ≤ M
′b(1−Ψb,n)
1+M ′+M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
,∑
i Si(p) ≤
m′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
m′Ψb,n+1
if M
′b(1−Ψb,n)
1+M ′+M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
≤ β ≤ b
b+1
,∑
i Si(p) ≤
m′Γ(n)+β b+1
b
m′Γ(n)+1
if β ≥ b
b+1
,
(17)
where M ′, β, Γ(n), Ψb,n are defined as in Theorem 2, m′ = me−b
N0
PT with m = maxi
{
Ti
T0
}
and
m′ = me
−b
N0
PT with m = mini
{
Ti
T0
}
.
In particular, we have ∑
i
Si(p) ≤ max
{
1, β
b+ 1
b
}
. (18)
Proof: When n = 1, the result follows directly from Theorem 2. When n > 1, by (8) and
(14), we have ∑
i
Si(p) =
βT0(
∑
i pi) +
∑
iGiTi
T0 +
∑
iGiTi
, (19)
where β = T˜0
T0
and Gi = e−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i(1−
bpj
1+b
).
(i) If β(∑i pi) ≤ 1, we have ∑i Si(p) ≤ β(∑i pi)+m∑j Gj1+m∑j Gj .
(ii) If β(∑i pi) ≥ 1, we have ∑i Si(p) ≤ β(∑i pi)+m∑j Gj1+m∑j Gj .
When β
(
b+1
b
)
≤ 1, we always have case (i) for all values of ∑i pi. In this case, let the maximum
of the total average power consumption
∑
i Si(p) at the better Nash equilibrium maximized over
the feasible throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ Ω(T1, . . . , Tn) be S˜. By Proposition 7, we have
S˜ ≤ max
{(p1,...,pn):
∑
pi≤
b+1
b
,0≤pi≤1}
β(
∑
i pi) +m
∑
j Gj
1 +m
∑
j Gj
.
Note that the right-hand side of the inequality equals to the maximum total average power
consumption at the better Nash equilibrium point of the case when all nodes use the same data
transmission period mT0. By Theorem 2, the first two inequalities in (17) can be obtained.
When β
(
b+1
b
)
≥ 1, both case (i) and case (ii) can happen. If β(∑i pi) ≤ 1 (i.e., case (i)), we
know from the second inequality of (17) and the proof of Theorem 2 that∑
i
Si(p) ≤
m′Ψb,n + β
b+1
b
m′Ψb,n + 1
≤
m′Ψb,n + β
b+1
b
m′Ψb,n + 1
≤
m′Γ(n) + β b+1
b
m′Γ(n) + 1
.
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In the case when β( b+1
b
) ≥ 1 and β(
∑
i pi) ≥ 1, again, let the maximum of the total
average power consumption
∑
i Si(p) at the better Nash equilibrium maximized over the feasible
throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ Ω(T1, . . . , Tn) be S˜. By Proposition 7, we have
S˜ ≤ max
{(p1,...,pn):
∑
pi≤
b+1
b
,0≤pi≤1}
β(
∑
i pi) +m
∑
j Gj
1 +m
∑
j Gj
.
The right-hand side of the inequality equals to the maximum total average power consumption at
the better Nash equilibrium point of the case when all nodes use the same data transmission period
mT0. By Theorem 2, and together with the above result for the β( b+1b ) ≥ 1 and β(
∑
i pi) ≤ 1
case, the last inequality in (17) can be obtained.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the feasible throughput region and power consumption of a CSMA-
based network with heterogenous nodes, where the MAC protocol is CSMA with the RTS/CTS
handshake. The feasible throughput region in this network was characterized, and an upper
bound of the total power consumption was provided for any throughput demands in the feasible
throughput region. Specifically, the upper bound is satisfied by one of three points in the feasible
throughput region depending on the RTS fraction when the lengths of the data transmission
periods for all nodes are equal.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let α = b
1+b
and ρ˜i = Tˆ0ρiP si (Ti)Ti(1−ρt) , both being constants determined by the system parameters.
To show that the system of equations in (11) have at most two solutions is equivalent to showing
that there are at most two solutions of (p1, . . . , pn) satisfying
ρ˜i = pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− αpj) , ∀i. (20)
In addition, we need to show that if a solution exists, there is exactly one solution with
∑
i pi ≤
b+1
b
. Without loss of generality, assume ρ˜i = maxj{ρ˜j} and minj{ρ˜j} > 0 (note: the node with
throughput demand 0 transmits RTS packets with probability 0, and can be excluded without
affecting the proof).
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By (20), we have
pj
1− αpj
=
ρ˜j
ρ˜i
pi
1− αpi
(21)
⇒ pj =
ρ˜j
ρ˜i
pi
1− αpi + α
ρ˜j
ρ˜i
pi
. (22)
This means that once pi is determined, pj is uniquely determined at the Nash equilibrium point,
and pj increases if pi increases. Taking logarithm and then differentiating with respect to pi on
both sides of (21), we have (
1
pj
+
α
1− αpj
)
dpj
dpi
=
1
pi
+
α
1− αpi
. (23)
Taking logarithm on both sides of (20), we have
ln ρ˜i = ln pi +
∑
j 6=i
ln [1− αpj] , g(pi).
Recall that pj can be seen as a function of pi by (22) and note that pj ≤ pi since ρ˜i = maxj{ρ˜j}.
We will show that there exist one or two solutions for pi with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 given any feasible
throughput demands. Specifically, we will show that g(pi) is a unimodal function (i.e., having
only one local maximum, and the point at which the maximum occurs is called the mode) in
pi. The derivative of g(pi) is given by
dg(pi)
dpi
=
1
pi
−
∑
j 6=i
(
α
1− αpj
dpj
dpi
)
.
Using (23), it follows that
dg(pi)
dpi
=
1
pi
−
∑
j 6=i
(
1
pi
+
α
1− αpi
)
αpj.
The function g(pi) is increasing if and only if dg(pi)dpi ≥ 0, that is,∑
j 6=i
αpj ≤
1
pi
1
pi
+ α
1−αpi
= 1− αpi
⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
pj ≤
1
α
=
b+ 1
b
.
Similarly, we have that g(pi) is decreasing if
∑n
j=1 pj ≥
b+1
b
. Since
∑n
j=1 pj is an increasing
function in pi (recall that pj increases if pi increases, ∀j), g(pi) is a unimodal function. Also
recall that pj, ∀j, is uniquely determined by pi. It follows that there are at most two solutions
given any feasible throughput demands, and exactly one is with
∑n
j=1 pj ≤
b+1
b
(the other with∑n
j=1 pj ≥
b+1
b
if there are two solutions). In summary, we can achieved any feasible throughput
demands by the request probabilities satisfying
∑n
i=1 pi ≤
b+1
b
.
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B. Proof of Theorem 2
For the case n = 1, the average power consumption S1(p1) can be obtained by using (2) and
(4). And it is straightforward to see that the maximum of S1(p1) occurs when p1 = 1.
We will prove for the n ≥ 2 case in the following. By (9) and (11), the Nash equilibrium
point (p1, . . . , pn) has the following relation when data transmission periods Ti = MT0 for all i
Gˆi = pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1 + b
)
, ∀i,
where Gˆi = ρˆie
b
N0
PT
M(1−ρt)
= Gie
b
N0
PT is defined to make the following proof concise.
We first give some lemmas required to complete the proof.
Lemma 1: Given fixed
∑n
i=1 pi = C at the better Nash equilibrium point (i.e., 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
and C ≤ b+1
b
), then the minimum of ∑ni=1 Gˆi can be achieved by (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) = (Cn , . . . , Cn ) and
the maximum of
∑n
i=1 Gˆi can be achieved by one of the following points
1) when C ≤ 1: (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) ∈ {(C, 0, . . . , 0) and its permutations}
2) when C ≥ 1: (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) ∈ {(1, C−1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, C−12 , C−12 , 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (1, C−1n−1 , . . . , C−1n−1 ),
and their permutations}
Proof: We can treat ∑i Gˆi as a function of (p1, . . . , pn), and find the critical points in the
region {
∑n
i=1 pi = C, 0 < pi < 1} by the Lagrange method:
∂
∂pi
{
n∑
i=1
Gˆi + λ
(
n∑
i=1
pi
)}
= 0
⇒
[∏
j 6=i
(
1−
b
1 + b
pj
)](
1−
∑
j 6=i
b
1+b
pj
1− b
1+b
pj
)
+ λ = 0.
Considering the partial derivatives for i = 1 and i = 2, we have[∏
j 6=1
(
1−
b
1 + b
pj
)](
1−
∑
j 6=1
b
1+b
pj
1− b
1+b
pj
)
=
[∏
j 6=2
(
1−
b
1 + b
pj
)](
1−
∑
j 6=2
b
1+b
pj
1− b
1+b
pj
)
⇐⇒
1
1− b
1+b
p1
[
1−
∑
j 6=1
b
1+b
pj
1− b
1+b
pj
]
=
1
1− b
1+b
p2
[
1−
∑
j 6=2
b
1+b
pj
1− b
1+b
pj
]
.
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Let γi = 11− b
1+b
pi
. We have
γ1
[
γ1 +
n∑
j=1
(1− γj)
]
= γ2
[
γ2 +
n∑
j=1
(1− γj)
]
⇒ − γ1γ2 + γ1(n− γ3 − · · · γn) = −γ1γ2 + γ2(n− γ3 − · · · γn)
⇒ γ1 = γ2 or
n∑
i=3
γi = n.
Similar results can be obtained by considering the partial derivatives with respect to any different
pi and pj . Therefore, we have
γi = γj ∀i, j (24)
or
n∑
i=3
γi = n⇒
n−1∑
i=2
γi = n (by the argument of symmetry)
⇒ γ2 = γn
⇒ γi = γj, ∀i, j (by the argument of symmetry). (25)
Both (24) and (25) result in pi = pj = Cn , ∀i, j. This shows that
∑n
i=1 Gˆi has only one critical
point in the region {
∑n
i=1 pi = C, 0 < pi < 1}, with value
n∑
i=1
Gˆi = C
(
1−
b
1 + b
C
n
)n−1
.
It can be shown that this value is a minimum. Since there is only one critical point, the minimum
can not occur on the boundary of the region. Hence (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) = (Cn , . . . ,
C
n
) achieves the global
minimum.
For the maximum of
∑n
i=1 Gˆi, we know that it must occur on the boundary of the region
{(p1, . . . , pn) :
∑n
i=1 pi = C, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1} because there is only one critical point and the point
is a minimum. Since the problem is symmetric with respect to the nodes, in the following, we
will only consider the representative solutions of (p∗1, . . . , p∗n). It is straightforward to see that
their permutations are also solutions.
When C ≤ 1, the boundary is
⋃n
j=1{(p1, . . . , pn) : pj = 0,
∑n
i=1,i 6=j pi = C, pi ≥ 0, ∀i 6= j}.
Note that if some pi’s are zeroes, then the corresponding nodes’ throughputs are zero, and we
can remove them and the problem is reduced to itself with fewer variables. So if (p∗1, . . . , p∗n)
achieves the maximum of
∑n
i=1 Gˆi, it must always be on the boundary when we reduce the
problem to another one with fewer variables. It can then be easily seen that the boundary point
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(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) = (C, 0, . . . , 0) achieves the maximum of
∑n
i=1 Gˆi, which can be verified since∑n
i=1 Gˆi ≤
∑n−1
i=1 pi = C.
When C > 1, the boundary is
⋃n
j=1
{
{(p1, . . . , pn) : pj = 0,
∑n
i=1,i 6=j pi = C, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i 6=
j}
⋃
{(p1, . . . , pn) : pj = 1,
∑n
i=1,i 6=j pi = C−1, pi ≥ 0, ∀i 6= j}
}
. We have the set of boundary
points {(C
2
, C
2
, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ( C
n−1
, . . . , C
n−1
, 0), and their permutations} which are critical points
that achieve the minimum
∑n
i=1 Gˆi (of the corresponding problem dimensions) as we remove the
zero-throughput nodes to reduce the problem. Taking the reduced problems as well as the original
problem into consideration, we can see that the the maximum of
∑n
i=1 Gˆi will eventually occur on
the boundary
⋃n
j=1{(p1, . . . , pn) : pj = 1,
∑n
i=1,i 6=j pi = C − 1, pi ≥ 0, ∀i 6= j}. Without loss of
generality, we consider the boundary points {(p1, . . . , pn−1, 1) :
∑n−1
i=1 pi = C−1, pi ≥ 0, i 6= n}.
Similar to the derivation of the minimum of
∑n
i=1 Gˆi, it can be shown that
∑n
i=1 Gˆi has only
one critical point (C−1
n−1
, . . . , C−1
n−1
, 1), which is the maximum, in the region {(p1, . . . , pn−1, 1) :∑n−1
i=1 pi = C−1, pi > 0, i 6= n}. Therefore, when C > 1 we only need to consider (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) ∈
{(1, C − 1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, C−1
2
,
C−1
2
, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (1, C−1
n−1
, . . . , C−1
n−1
) and their permutations} for
the maximum
∑n
i=1 Gˆi. The proof is complete.
Lemma 2: In a network consisting of n homogeneous nodes having the same data transmission
period Ti = MT0, ∀i, the same channel code and feasible throughput demands (ρ, . . . , ρ), we
have the average power consumption at the better Nash equilibrium point increase as ρ increases.
Proof: By (11), we have the following relation for any feasible throughput demands (ρ, . . . , ρ):
ρˆ
(1− nρˆ)M ′
= p
(
1−
bp
1 + b
)n−1
⇒ ρˆ =
M ′p(1− αp)n−1
1 + nM ′p(1− αp)n−1
, (26)
where M ′ = Me−b
N0
PT , ρˆ = ρ
P s
, P s is the average frame success rate when the data transmission
period is MT0, α = b1+b and (p, . . . , p) is the request probability vector.
It can be easily verified that the maximum of ρ is achieved when p = 1
nα
, and the value of
ρ increases as p increases when 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
nα
. That is, the feasible throughput demand ρ is an
increasing function in p at the better Nash equilibrium point (recall that np ≤ 1
α
at the better
Nash equilibrium point by Theorem 1).
It remains to show that the average power consumption given by
Si(p) = ρˆ+ β(1− nρˆ)p
is an increasing function in p for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
nα
, where β = T˜0
T0
. Equivalently, we will show that
dSi(p)
dp
≥ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
nα
.
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Substitute (26) into Si(p) and then differentiate with respect to p. After some manipulations,
we arrive at
dSi(p)
dp
=
M ′(1− αp)n(1− αpn+ αp2βn2 − βαp2n) + β(1− αp)2
[1− αp+ nM ′p(1− αp)n]2
.
For 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
nα
, we have 0 ≤ αpn ≤ 1 and (βpn− βp− 1) ≥ −1. Thus
1 + αpn(βpn− βp− 1) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ 1− αpn+ αp2βn2 − βαp2n ≥ 0.
It can then be easily observed that dSi(p)
dp
≥ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
nα
.
We now start the proof of Theorem 2 for n > 1.
Proof of Theorem 2:
By (8) and (14), we have the total average power consumption for throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
as follows ∑
i
Si(p) =
β(
∑
i pi) +M
∑
iGi
1 +M
∑
iGi
. (27)
We want to find the maximum of the total average power consumption given by (27) among
all feasible throughput demands at the better Nash equilibrium point, or equivalently among the
set {p : 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 ∀ i,
∑
i pi ≤
b+1
b
} by Proposition 7.
First note that the function f(x) = K+x
1+x
, x ≥ 0 is an increasing function if K < 1, and a
decreasing function if K > 1. So for fixed
∑
i pi we have
(i) If β(∑i pi) ≤ 1, ∑i Si(p) is maximized when ∑iGi is maximized.
(ii) If β(∑i pi) ≥ 1, ∑i Si(p) is maximized when ∑iGi is minimized.
When β( b+1
b
) ≤ 1, we have case (i) for all values of ∑i pi because ∑i pi ≤ b+1b . For this
case, it follows from Lemma 1 and Gˆi = Gieb
N0
PT that we only need to consider
• when C ≤ 1: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ {(C, 0, . . . , 0) and its permutations};
• when 1 ≤ C ≤ b+1
b
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ {(1, C − 1, 0, . . . , 0), (1,
C−1
2
,
C−1
2
, 0, . . . , 0), . . . ,
(1, C−1
n−1
, . . . , C−1
n−1
), and their permutations}.
Due to the symmetry of the problem, we will only consider the representative (p1, . . . , pn)’s. By
(27) and (2), the maximum of ∑i Si(p) when (p1, . . . , pn) = (C, 0, . . . , 0) with ∑i pi = C ≤ 1
is clearly M ′+β
M ′+1
when C = 1, where M ′ = Me−b
N0
PT . For 1 ≤ C ≤ b+1
b
, the total average power
consumption
∑
i Si(p) when (p1, . . . , pn) = (1, x, . . . , x), with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1(n−1)b , is given by∑
i
Si((1, x, . . . , x)) =
β[1 + (n− 1)x] +M ′[1 + (n− 1)x− nαx](1− αx)n−2
1 +M ′[1 + (n− 1)x− nαx](1 − αx)n−2
, (28)
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where α = b
1+b
.
We first consider the point (1, C−1
n−1
, . . . , C−1
n−1
). Define
Φb,n(x) = [1 + (n− 1)x− nαx](1 − αx)
n−2
and
Ψb,n = Φb,n
(
1
(n− 1)b
)
=
(n− 1)(1 + b)2 − nb
b(1 + b)(n− 1)
[
bn+ n− b− 2
(1 + b)(n− 1)
]n−2
. (29)
From (28), when x = 1
(n−1)b
,∑
i
Si((1, x, . . . , x)) =
M ′Ψb,n + β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n + 1
.
We will show that the maximum of
∑
i Si((1, x, . . . , x)) is either
M ′+β
M ′+1
when x = 0, or M
′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
when x = 1
(n−1)b
, that is,
max
0≤x≤ 1
(n−1)b
∑
i
Si((1, x, . . . , x)) = max
{
M ′ + β
M ′ + 1
,
M ′Ψb,n + β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n + 1
}
. (30)
Note that for M ′+β
M ′+1
to be the maximum, we have
M ′ + β
M ′ + 1
≥
∑
i
Si((1, x, . . . , x))
⇔ β ≤
M ′(1− Φb,n(x))
(M ′ + 1)(1 + (n− 1)x)− (1 +M ′Φb,n(x))
, β1.
Similarly, for M
′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
to be the maximum,
M ′Ψb,n + β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n + 1
≥
∑
i
Si((1, x, . . . , x))
⇔ β ≥
M ′(Φb,n(x)−Ψb,n)
(M ′Φb,n(x) + 1)
b+1
b
− (1 + (n− 1)x)(1 +M ′Ψb,n)
, β2.
To prove (30), we will show that β1 ≥ β2. In that case, if β > β1 (M ′+βM ′+1 is not the maximum),
we will have β > β2 (M
′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
is the maximum). Similarly, if β < β2 (M
′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
is not
the maximum), we will have β < β1 (M ′+βM ′+1 is the maximum).
We first show that Φb,n(x) is decreasing in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1(n−1)b .
d
dx
Φb,n(x) ≤ 0⇔ α(nα− n+ 1)x ≤ (2α− 1)
This inequality is satisfied if (nα − n + 1) ≤ 0, since x ≥ 0 and 2α − 1 = 2 b
1+b
− 1 > 1
3
. If
(nα − n + 1) > 0, or equivalently, n < b + 1, we need to show that x ≤ 2α−1
α(nα−n+1)
. This is
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satisfied because we have n ≥ 2 > b+1
b
and then x ≤ 1
(n−1)b
< 2α−1
α(nα−n+1)
. Therefore, Φb,n(x) is
decreasing in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
(n−1)b
.
The fact that Φb,n(x) is decreasing in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1(n−1)b implies that (M
′Φb,n(x) + 1)
b+1
b
−
(1 + (n− 1)x)(1 +M ′Ψb,n) is decreasing in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1(n−1)b , and it follows that (M
′Φb,n(x) +
1) b+1
b
− (1 + (n − 1)x)(1 +M ′Ψb,n) ≥ 0 since its value is zero when x = 1(n−1)b . In addition,
(M ′ + 1)(1 + (n− 1)x)− (1 +M ′Φb,n(x)) is increasing in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1(n−1)b , and (M
′ + 1)(1 +
(n− 1)x)− (1 +M ′Φb,n(x)) ≥ 0 since its value is zero when x = 0. With these properties, we
have
β1 ≥ β2
⇔ (1− Φb,n(x))
[
(M ′Φb,n(x) + 1)
b+ 1
b
− (1 + (n− 1)x)(1 +M ′Ψb,n)
]
≥ (Φb,n(x)−Ψb,n)[(M
′ + 1)(1 + (n− 1)x)− (1 +M ′Φb,n(x))]
⇔
1 +M ′Φb,n(x)
b
[bx(1 − n)(1−Ψb,n) + 1− Φb,n(x)] ≥ 0.
Let U(x) = bx(1−n)(1−Ψb,n)+1−Φb,n(x). We have U(0) = 0 and U( 1(n−1)b ) = 0, so β1 ≥ β2
if the second derivative of U(x), d2U
dx2
≤ 0 in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
(n−1)b
.
d2U
dx2
≤ 0⇔ α(n− 2)(n− nα− 1)x ≥ (n− 2)(2− 3α)
Note that 2 − 3α = 2 − 3 b
1+b
< 0. The above inequality is clearly satisfied if n − nα − 1 ≥ 0
(that is, n ≥ b+1) or n = 2, so we only need to show that x ≤ 2−3α
α(n−nα−1)
if 3 ≤ n < b+1. We
have
x ≤
1
(n− 1)b
≤
2− 3α
α(n− nα− 1)
⇔ n ≥
b2 − 1
b2 − b− 1
,
which is satisfied because n ≥ 3 ≥ b2−1
b2−b−1
. Now, we have completed the proof of (30).
For the points (1, C−1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, C−1
2
,
C−1
2
, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (1, C−1
n−2
, . . . , C−1
n−2
, 0), the above
proof still applies, and results similar to (30) (with some nodes having zero request probabilities)
can be derived. We find that for b > 2, Ψb,2 < · · · < Ψb,n, or equivalently,
M ′Ψb,2+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,2+1
< · · · <
M ′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
. Therefore, we conclude that when β b+1
b
≤ 1, the maximum total average power
consumption of the n-node network is either M ′+β
M ′+1
or
M ′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
. The inequality Ψb,i+1−Ψb,i >
0 can be shown by transforming it into a polynomial of b, and showing that it is positive for
b > 2. Because it is difficult to mathematically prove this, we plot the polynomial and observe
that the polynomial is positive for b > ζi (or 0 < 1b < 1ζi by using the corresponding polynomial
with variable b′ = 1
b
), where ζi ≤ 2 and is decreasing in i, as shown in Fig. 2.
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Comparing M ′+β
M ′+1
and M
′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
, we have
M ′Ψb,n + β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n + 1
≥
M ′ + β
M ′ + 1
⇐⇒ β ≥
M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
1 +M ′ +M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
.
Therefore, when β( b+1
b
) ≤ 1, the total average power consumption of the n-node network∑
i Si(p) ≤
M ′+β
M ′+1
if β ≤ M
′b(1−Ψb,n)
1+M ′+M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
; and
∑
i Si(p) ≤
M ′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
if M
′b(1−Ψb,n)
1+M ′+M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
≤
β ≤ b
b+1
.
When β( b+1
b
) ≥ 1, both case (i) and case (ii) can happen. If β(∑i pi) ≤ 1 (i.e., case
(i)), we know from the above derivation that ∑i Si(p) ≤ M ′Ψb,n+β b+1bM ′Ψb,n+1 because β ≥ bb+1 >
M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
1+M ′+M ′b(1−Ψb,n)
. Now define Γ(k) , b+1
b
(1 − 1
k
)k−1. By Lemma 1, the minimum of
∑
i Gˆi
when
∑
i pi =
b+1
b
is Γ(n) which is achieved when pi = b+1nb , ∀i. Since Ψb,n is a realization
of
∑
i Gˆi, we have Γ(n) ≤ Ψb,n. Therefore, when β( b+1b ) ≥ 1 and β(
∑
i pi) ≤ 1 we have∑
i Si(p) ≤
M ′Ψb,n+β
b+1
b
M ′Ψb,n+1
≤
M ′Γ(n)+β b+1
b
M ′Γ(n)+1
.
When β( b+1
b
) ≥ 1 and β(
∑
i pi) ≥ 1 (i.e., case (ii)), it follows from Lemma 1 that the
minimum of
∑
iGi is achieved when all pi’s are equal. In addition, by Lemma 2, the total average
power consumption
∑
i Si(p) at the better Nash equilibrium point in a homogeneous network
is maximized by the maximum feasible throughput demands. For n homogenous nodes with
throughput demands (ρ, . . . , ρ), we have the maximum feasible throughput nρmax = M
′Γ(n)
1+M ′Γ(n)
P s
(obtained when p = 1
nα
by (26)), where P s is the average frame success rate when the data
transmission period is MT0. By (27) with
∑
iGi = e
−b
N0
PT
b+1
b
(
1− 1
n
)n−1
, the corresponding∑
i Si(p) is
M ′Γ(n)+β b+1
b
M ′Γ(n)+1
.
In summary, when β( b+1
b
) ≥ 1,
∑
i Si(p) ≤
M ′Γ(n)+β b+1
b
M ′Γ(n)+1
. In addition, 1 ≤ M
′Γ(n)+β b+1
b
M ′Γ(n)+1
≤ β b+1
b
.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the CSMA by the RTS/CTS handshake mechanism in the network.
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Fig. 2. The plot of ζi such that Ψb,i < Ψb,i+1 for b > ζi.
